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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to establish a methodological foundation for Human-
Computer Interaction (HCI) researchers aiming to assess trust between people 
interacting via computer-mediated communication (CMC) technology.  The most 
popular experimental paradigm currently employed by HCI researchers are social 
dilemma games based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), a technique originating from 
economics. HCI researchers employing this experimental paradigm currently interpret 
the rate of cooperation - measured in the form of collective pay-off - as the level of 
trust the technology allows its users to develop. We argue that this interpretation is 
problematic, since the game’s synchronous nature models only very specific trust 
situations. Furthermore, experiments that are based on PD games cannot model the 
complexity of how trust is formed in the real world, since they neglect factors such as 
ability and benevolence. In conclusion, we recommend (a) means of improving social 
dilemma experiments by using asynchronous Trust Games, (b) collecting a broader 
range (in particular qualitative) data, and (c) increasing use of longitudinal studies. 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Trust  in  Computer-Mediated-Communications 
Computer-mediated communication (CMC) technology supports interaction 
between people in many areas such as business and education today. Over the past 
decade, Human Computer Interaction (HCI) researchers have sought to identify 
specific usability criteria for these technologies. Within the traditional framework of 
task performance, user satisfaction, and user cost (Shackel, 1991), HCI researchers 
have investigated task effectiveness and efficiency (e.g. Olson, Olson, & Meader, 
1995) and users' ratings of audio and video quality (e.g. Watson & Sasse, 1996) to 
decide whether technology can effectively support interaction.  In recent years, the 
scope has been broadened to investigate more subtle and complex effects of the 
technology on users themselves (such as their physiological responses - Wilson & 
Sasse, 2000), their performance on highly complex tasks (such as the ability to detect 
deception – Horn, 2001) and interaction style or patterns (Monk & Watts, 2000; 
Vertegaal, Slagter, van der Holt, & Nijholt, 2001). The current focus of investigation 
is the degree to which users assess trustworthiness and establish trust in each other 
when interacting via CMC technology.  Trust is an important consideration for two 
reasons:  
1.  Mediated interactions carry an increased risk. As users might be placed in 
different contexts or cultures, misunderstandings become more likely, and 
enforcement of agreements and regulations becomes more difficult. As risks 
increase and become more difficult to evaluate, users of collaborative 
technologies face more complex decisions. Trust helps to reduce this 
complexity – it is a shortcut for a full-scale, laborious evaluation of the risks and benefits involved (Luhmann, 1979; Adams & Sasse, 2001; Lahno, 2002a). 
Hence, computer-mediated communication or interaction requires more a 
priori trust than face-to-face interaction.  
2.  Many users of advanced communication technology state that they find it hard 
to develop trust with someone they cannot see face-to-face. This problem is 
commonly attributed to the fact that these technologies do not convey the full 
richness of face-to-face encounters. They omit cues that are thought to be 
crucial for trust-building (Whittaker & O'Connaill, 1997; Döring, 1998; Mitra, 
2002). 
Thus, as communication technologies replace face-to-face encounters, there is 
the danger of a proliferation of low-trust interactions. In the long run, low-trust 
interactions are more costly than trust-based interactions due to the increased need for 
contractual agreements and external enforcements (Diekmann & Lindenberg, 2001; 
Handy, 1995). To evaluate the trust-building capability of different technologies, HCI 
researchers need valid and reliable measures of the trust users develop in their remote 
communication partners. Most CMC studies investigating trust employ social 
dilemma games based on the Prisoner's Dilemma as means of measuring trust within 
dyads or groups. These studies measure players' rate of cooperation and defection 
('cheating') while they play these games over CMC-channels. The conditions studied 
include different media (such as text chat, audio, and video) and different forms of 
acquiring information about other players prior to distant interaction.  
In this paper we critically review the current use of social dilemma games for 
trust measurement in CMC-research. First we define trust and introduce social 
dilemma games, with a special emphasis on games with a Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) 
structure, as these are widely used in CMC (section 2.1). We then consider their use 
as an experimental paradigm in economics and sociology to measure cooperation 
among individuals (section 2.2). In section 2.3, we specifically review current studies 
in CMC that employ social dilemma games to infer trust among users of distant 
interaction technologies. In section 3, we present the argument why the trust-building 
potential of a communication medium cannot be inferred from cooperation rates in 
PD-based social dilemma games alone.  The main reasons are the synchronous nature 
of the games used (section 3.2), and the fact that social dilemma games model only 
limited aspects of trust (section 3.3). 
1.2 Definitions 
 
Trust is the chicken soup of social life. It brings us all sorts of good 
things – from a willingness to get involved in our communities to 
higher rates of economic growth (…), to making daily life more 
pleasant. Yet, like chicken soup, it appears to work somewhat 
mysteriously. 
(Uslaner, 2002, p. 1) 
 
 
The term trust is used in everyday language, but everyone has a slightly 
different understanding of what it actually entails. In the scientific community, the 
situation is unfortunately not very different. Trust has been studied for many years in 
many disciplines and there is a plethora of trust definitions researchers can choose 
from (Corritore, Kracher, & Wiedenbeck, 2001). The definitions contrast on different dimensions and are applicable to different situations. In this paper, we focus on trust 
between individuals in organisational settings (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995).  
Trust is only required in the presence of risk. We need to trust when we lack 
exact knowledge of others' motives and abilities, and thus cannot foresee their future 
actions. Hence, the definition of trust most researchers (both in the domain of 
organisational studies and CMC) agree on is as follows. 
 
Trust is the willingness to be vulnerable based on positive 
expectations about the actions of others
1.  
 
This definition is the lowest common denominator of trust. Corritore et al. 
(2001) call it an 'abstract definition', to distinguish it from operational definitions, 
which are applicable to specific real-world situations. The definition is abstract, 
because it does not name any sources of vulnerability nor does it clarify the structure 
of trust-requiring situations. As we will discuss later, trust situations differ widely in 
their structure (section 4.2) and in their sources of vulnerability (section 4.3). Both 
factors have a profound effect on the way trust is built. It is thus dangerous to take this 
abstract definition as a basis for experimental operationalisation without further 
discussing the effects of structure and source of vulnerability. The definition by 
Bacharach & Gambetta (2001) is more specific about the structure of situations 
requiring trust: 
 
In general, we say that a person ‘trusts someone to do X’ if 
she acts on the expectation that he will do X when both know 
that two conditions obtain: if he fails to do X she would have 
done better to act otherwise, and her acting in the way she 
does gives him a selfish reason not to do X. 
(Bacharach & Gambetta, 2001). 
 
This definition differentiates between the trustor – the individual who acts 
first by trusting – and the trustee – the second mover who has to decide whether to 
cooperate or cheat. Hence it is a definition of asynchronous trust situations. Situations 
of mutual trust (when both individuals involved are trustor and trustee at the same 
time) are referred to as synchronous trust situations (see section 3.2). Furthermore, the 
above definition implicitly introduces the notion of trustworthiness. A trustworthy 
actor foregoes situational temptations based on incentives that are not defined by the 
situation at hand. Such incentives are based on trust-warranting properties of the 
trustee (Bacharach & Gambetta, 2001). Examples include norms, affection, or fear of 
punishment. We will discuss them in more depths in section 3.3. 
2 Social  Dilemmas 
Situations in which individual rational outcome contravenes collective rational 
outcome are known as social dilemmas. In these situations, individuals' efforts to 
maximise their own outcome will result in a reduced outcome for everyone (including 
themselves). An example of such a situation is trading: each trader is better off 
                                                 
1 This definition is used by Zand (1972), Boss (1978), Mayer et al. (1995), McAllister (1995), 
Rocco (1998), and Corritore et al. (2001). 
 receiving the other’s good without giving his own. However, both traders acting in 
this way will result in no exchange of goods, which is less desirable for both than a 
completed exchange. Social dilemmas are often seen as prototypical situations that 
require trust: actors have to forego maximised situational benefit and they have to 
trust others to do the same in order to achieve a maximal collective outcome. 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (Tucker, 1950; Flood, 1952) is the most prominent 
social dilemma, but not the only one. Other examples are Assurance Games and Stag 
Hunt (Kollock, 1998). Most experimental research based on social dilemmas uses an 
incentive structure that is based on the Prisoner Dilemma. Below we introduce this 
particular social dilemma in detail. 
2.1 Prisoner’s  Dilemma 
In experimental Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) games, two players’ decisions are 
associated with monetary rewards. The outcome with the highest pay-off for one 
particular player is to defect while the other player cooperates (DC), next is 
cooperation by both players (CC), followed by joint defection (DD). The outcome 
with the smallest pay-off results from cooperating while the other player defects 
(CD). Table 1 exemplifies the pay-off in a PD game. 
As can be seen from Table 1, the individually rational decision to defect will 
lead to suboptimal outcome for both players: Both will be left with an outcome of 1 
rather than 2. Thus, if both players were fully rational and would only decide based on 
the pay-offs defined by the game, they would always choose to defect in a one-off 
game as this is the Nash-Equilibrium of the game (Nash, 1950). Independent from the 
other player's decision, this will always be the best decision in retrospective 
(Poundstone 1993). We refer to social dilemma games with a Prisoner Dilemma pay-
off structure as PD-based games. 
 
  Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate  2
2 
3
0 
Defect  0
3 
1
1 
Table 1: Pay-off distribution in a PD game. The row player’s pay-offs are in the lower 
left corner of the cell. The values are for illustration only. 
 
However, in experimental PD games and in real-world situations that have a 
PD structure, actors do not just act on situational pay-off, but on their utilities. 
Utilities are a reflection of the players’ real preferences. These will be influenced by 
many factors other than just the rewards given in a one-off PD game. Experimental 
rewards as they are given in Table 1 are also called endogenous pay-off, as they are 
defined within a one-off game. These endogenous pay-offs will influence each 
player’s utility, but the actual utility associated with each outcome will also be shaped 
by exogenous pay-offs. These are pay-offs associated by the individual to particular 
outcomes – and are governed by situational factors. Expectation of future interaction 
– in experiments often introduced through iterated games – transforms the utilities of 
the outcomes in an individual games. Conditional cooperation becomes a rational 
option as it might induce the other player to cooperate in future rounds (Axelrod, 
1980; Dieckmann & Lindenberg, 2001). Examples of other pay-off transforming 
factors include desire to comply with norms, benevolence, or expected future interaction beyond the experiment (see section 3). These arguments are captured in 
Table 2. It illustrates how the hierarchy of preferences might change when exogenous 
pay-offs are factored in. In the example given, the row-player attaches value to 
cooperation irrespective of the move made by the other player. 
 
  Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate  2 
2+2 
3 
0+2 
Defect  0 
3+0 
1 
1+0 
Table 2: Hypothetical utilities of the row-player.  In this example the row-player 
attaches value to cooperation irrespective of the other player’s action. 
Thus, experimental PD games are games of incomplete information, as a 
participant does not know the other participant’s true utility for each outcome. The 
missing information about exogenous pay-offs must be estimated from other cues 
available. This conflict between endogenous and exogenous pay-off reflects the 
conflict between situational temptation and trust-warranting properties that are central 
to trust. This conflict makes PD games interesting models for trust research. The 
factors that lead people to cooperate in the face of conflicting endogenous pay-off are 
of major interest. Hundreds of studies have examined the conditions of cooperation in 
social dilemma situations by using experimental PD games.  
2.2  Social Dilemma Games in Experimental Economics  
The two-person PD game described above can be seen as a special case of n-
person PD games, where a larger group of individuals interact with each other. In 
experimental economics, n-person PD games are seen as models of public good 
problems that are of core interest in macroeconomics and policy-making (Taylor, 
1987). Free riding is an example for a public good dilemma: Each person is better off 
using the bus without paying, i.e. defecting, but if everyone does this, the service will 
not be provided. Clearly, for this example, real-world collaboration is enforced 
through control and penalties. One structurally defining element of these public good 
problems is that they can be seen as synchronous games. Due to the size of the group, 
an actor in a public good problem cannot base his or her decision on knowledge about 
all the other actors’ decisions. A PD game's synchronous structure is thus a good 
model of such situations. Furthermore, public good dilemmas are symmetric dilemmas 
as all individuals are confronted with the same situational pay-offs. In public good 
studies, collective pay-off is interpreted as a measure of cooperation in a group. Joint 
pay-off will be highest if all players cooperate, and lowest for collective defection.  
In the real world, individuals cooperate in the face of conflicting pay-offs. Raub & 
Weesie (2000) name three broad categories of exogenous factors that ensure 
cooperation in social dilemma situations: (1) time – expectation of future interaction; 
(2)  institutions – e.g. law enforcement agencies; (3) social networks – e.g. by 
providing reputation information. These factors can transform the utilities associated 
with each outcome in a way that makes cooperation a rational choice. In experimental 
studies, researchers have identified further factors that influence cooperation, as they 
can exclude or control the effects of time, institutions, and social networks. Table 3 
gives an overview on the six most important experimental treatments that influence 
cooperation in experimental games based on a prisoner dilemma structure. They have 
been identified by Sally (1995) in a meta-review of 130 treatments in 37 studies from 
1958 to 1992.   
POSITIVE EFFECT ON COOPERATION  SALLY’S  
VARIABLE NAME 
Direct Communication (between players) 
Frequency of verbal communication between participants measured as ratio of 
discussion periods to decisions. 
FREQDISC 
Instructions 
The experimental instructions favoured cooperation over defection. 
COOP 
Indirect Communication (via experimenter)  
Experimenter elicited promises regarding their decisions in the game from 
participants.  
PROMISES 
Iterated Games 
Number of rounds the game was played with a fixed partner. 
LNITER 
NEGATIVE EFFECT ON COOPERATION   
Relative pay-off 
Temptation to defect - measured as the difference between defection and cooperation 
pay-off relative to the cooperation pay-off. 
TEMP 
Type of pay-off   
Real money used as an incentive. 
MONEY 
Instructions 
The experimental instructions asked participants to improve relative gain. A 
competitive orientation was induced. 
COMP 
Table 3: Treatments influencing cooperation in experimental PD games (out of 21 
analysed by Sally (1995)). 
In the context of CMC-research, the clear positive effect that verbal 
communication has on cooperation is most relevant. Researchers assume that face-to-
face communication might help to create group identity or trigger internalised norms 
of social conduct (Poundstone, 1993; Sally, 1995; Frohlich & Oppenheimer, 1998). In 
a study relevant to trust in CMC, Frohlich & Oppenheimer (1998) compared the effect 
of email vs. face-to-face communication, and concluded that face-to-face 
communication is more effective in stimulating cooperation in PD games. Bohnet & 
Frey (1998) argue that face-to-face communication provides two independent factors 
that support cooperation – the information exchanged and the mutual identification 
achieved by looking at each other.  They demonstrated that silent identification before 
the game also increases cooperation among participants, a result they attribute to a 
decrease in social distance.  
2.3  Social Dilemma Games in CMC 
2.3.1 Studies  &  Results 
The effect of the communication channel is the core interest of social dilemma 
studies in CMC. Joint pay-off, the measure of cooperation, is interpreted as an 
indicator of trust the participants hold in each other. These studies commonly use 
social dilemma games with dyads (Jensen et al., 2000; Zheng et al., 2002; Davis et al., 
2002)
 2 or groups (Rocco, 1998; Bos et al., 2002). One study used one-off games, in 
which participants played only one round of a game with each other (Jensen et al.; 
2000).  The other studies relied on iterated games, in which the participants played 
several rounds of the game. In the iterated studies, communication between 
                                                 
2 Davis et al. (2002) do not focus on cooperation but on rates of defection. They interpret this 
measure as an indicator of general 'bad behaviour'. participants was allowed every five rounds of the game (Rocco, 1998; Bos et al., 
2002; Zheng et al., 2002) or continuously (Davis et al., 2002).  
 
EFFECT OF COMMUNICATION CHANNEL 
Author(s)  Iterated?  Group?  Conditions  Further data  
Jensen, 
Farnham, 
Drucker, & 
Kollock  
(2000) 
Yes Dyad  Face-to-face,  text-chat 
text to speech, phone 
conference 
Rating of other participant: 
Likeability, Trustworthiness, 
Intelligence. 
Bos, Olson, 
Gergle, 
Olson, & 
Wright (2002) 
Yes 3  person 
group 
Face-to-face, 
videoconference, phone 
conference, text chat 
Post-experiment trust ratings 
of other players. 
Davis, 
Farnham, & 
Jensen (2002) 
Yes  Dyad  Text chat, text to speech,  
text chat & information 
sheet 
 
EFFECT OF MODE OF AQUAINTANCE  
Author(s)  Iterated?  Group?  Conditions  Further data  
Rocco (1998)  Yes  Group  Face-to-face, email, pre-
game face-to-face inter-
action then email 
Content analysis of messages 
Questionnaire on group 
identity 
Zheng, 
Veinott, Bos, 
Olson, & 
Olson (2002) 
 
Yes Dyad  Face-to-face,  social  text 
chat, photo, information 
sheet, no communication 
Post-experiment trust ratings 
of other players. 
Table 4: CMC studies that used PD games to measure trust. 
Most studies used games with continuous investments. These games - unlike 
the classic PD game, which only has binary decisions - allowed for cooperation or 
defection on a continuous scale. Rocco (1998), Bos et al. (2002) and Zheng et al. 
(2002) achieved this by framing the game as an investment game, called Daytrader. 
Davis et al. (2002) used a game with a binary PD game structure. This game was 
framed as computer game called WindUp World. Rather than just deciding on 
defection or cooperation, players navigated wind-up toys through a virtual world. 
When they met, the players had to decide whether they wanted to wind each other up 
(cooperation), or short-circuit the other player (defection). Table 4 gives an overview 
on the types of games used and on the conditions under research. These conditions 
can be divided in two sets. First, there are studies that compare the effect of the 
communication channel used while playing the game (Jensen et al., 2000; Bos et al., 
2002; Davis et al., 2002). These studies conclude that richer media result in higher 
rates of cooperation. The audio only and video and audio conditions reach levels of 
cooperation that are similar to those reached in face-to-face communication. They are 
however reached after more iterations than in face-to-face interaction. Furthermore, 
cooperation is less stable without communication, as defection increases towards the 
end of games (Bos et al., 2002). 
The second set of studies researched the effect of prior acquaintance and 
personal information on cooperation (Rocco, 1998; Zheng et al., 2002). The 
motivation for this approach is to investigate Handy’s (1995) claim that trust ‘requires touch’. Giddens (1990) calls this commonly observed grounding of distant interaction 
in face-to-face contacts re-embedding. Rocco (1998) did indeed find a positive effect 
of prior face-to-face acquaintance on cooperation. Zheng et al. (2002) researched 
whether this effect can be reached by other means. They isolated three aspects of 
face-to-face interaction: synchronous interaction, visual identification and exchange 
of personal information. They compared the effect of face-to-face interaction, social 
text-chat, a photograph of the participant, and a personal information sheet
3. Davis et 
al. (2002) also included a personal information sheet in their study. The results from 
this set of studies draw a picture similar to the studies in the other set: The richer the 
channel by which participants got to know each other, the higher the cooperation rate 
in the social dilemma game. Both studies report a very limited effect of the personal 
information sheet.  
2.3.2 Cooperation  as  a Measure of Trust 
The interpretation of cooperation as trust in situations with a PD structure is based on 
the abstract definition of trust as willingness to be vulnerable based on positive 
expectations about the actions of others (see section 1.2). Indeed, the decision to 
cooperate carries more risk: A player will regret having chosen to cooperate fully if 
the other player chooses to defect completely. When choosing to defect, a player will 
never have to regret the choice, as it will always be the better option independent of 
the other player’s decision.   
However, we argue that PD-based social dilemma games can be too limited 
when assessing a technology's trust-building potential for two major reasons: (1) 
Social dilemma games based on a PD-structure model a very specific subset of trust-
requiring situations where decisions on cooperation and defection have to be reached 
synchronously: in PD-based games the trustor is at the same time trustee. This 
introduces a further risk, strategic insecurity, and makes the interpretation of 
cooperation and defection difficult (see section 3.2). (2) Wilful defection is only one 
source of vulnerability. There are further ones that are difficult to model in social 
dilemma games (see section 3.3). 
3 Critique of Social Dilemma Games in CMC-
Research 
3.1 Risk  Modelling 
Trust has been described as a device to reduce complexity, a shortcut to avoid 
complex decision-making processes when facing decisions that carry risk. Trust is of 
particular importance when an individual knows little about the type, quantity and 
gravity of outcomes associated with a particular decision. As stated in section 1, this 
is one of the reasons for the importance of trust in distant interaction. Users of 
communication technologies face more – and often less understood – risks than 
interactants in face-to-face situations (Riegelsberger & Sasse, 2001). In a social 
dilemma game, participants are very well aware of the gravity and nature of risks 
associated with their decisions. However, many real-world risks will be perceived as 
threats, rather than risks, as they cannot by quantified by the actors. Trust is needed 
                                                 
3 This sheet contained the information commonly exchanged in a get-acquainted small talk. precisely when individuals cannot ‘calculate’ a utility for every possible outcome, or 
where this calculation would be too costly (Kee & Knox, 1970).  
Secondly, for ethical reasons, all experiments lack the ability to create serious 
risks for the participants. Participants in the studies do not lose money in the course of 
the experiment – rather, their decisions determine the size of their gain. From a 
mathematical point of view, there may be no difference between a loss, and missing a 
gain that was expected. However, Kahnemann, Slovic, & Tversky (1982) showed that 
individuals’ decisions depend on whether the outcomes are framed as loss or gain: 
generally, people are keener to avoid loss than to achieve gain. As a further example, 
sharing an idea in a brainstorming exercise carries the risk of embarrassment if the 
idea was only half-baked or – on the other hand – the risk of not being acknowledged 
as having conceived a good idea if it is taken on board by the whole team. Thus, 
whereas real-world risks are usually multi-dimensional and include non-monetary 
cost (such as embarrassment, loss of privacy or cognitive cost), in a social dilemma 
experiment, risks are generally monetary.  
Furthermore, in the real world, it is often impossible for trustors to find out 
whether they have been cheated, or whether they are victims of unlucky 
circumstances. A colleague who does not deliver an important milestone on a project 
might just have had to prioritise another task or she might have wilfully sabotaged the 
project. The a priori trust one has in that colleague will determine how their 
behaviour is interpreted, and how one will react. Zheng et al. (2002) addressed this 
problem by introducing ‘market fluctuations’ in their version of the Daytrader game. 
These market fluctuations allow participants to withhold part of their investment and 
then blame the fluctuations for a lower than expected joint pay-off. This measure 
makes it impossible for participants to clearly identify defection. The complexity of 
their considerations is thus increased.  
3.2  Synchronous Social Dilemma Games 
If I do not trust the other player in a PD game to cooperate, I will choose not 
to cooperate myself - which makes me a defector. Even though I might want to act in 
a trustworthy manner, I have to defect pre-emptively if I do not trust the other player, 
to avoid being the  ‘loser’ (Poundstone, 1993; Bacharach & Gambetta, 2001). This 
also holds true for games that allow continuous investments, in particular those that 
include windfall payments (cf. Zheng et al., 2002; Bos et al., 2002): I may want to 
invest fully, however, as other players might not invest fully, I should pre-emptively 
withhold some of my investment. As the windfall payments amplify minor 
differences, they make withholding investment very attractive in the rounds prior to 
the payout. Thus, pre-emptive withholding investment also becomes very likely.  
As each player in a PD game is trustor and trustee at the same time, defection 
might take place due to any of the following reasons: 
1.  Egotism: The player has an individualistic or competitive orientation (Gallo & 
McClintock, 1965). The player is not trustworthy (has no trust-warranting 
properties) and just acts on the situational pay-off. 
2.  Lack of trust: Defection takes place due to defensive motives, as the other 
player is expected to defect. The player might want to withdraw rather than 
defect, but the PD game forces him or her to act as a defector if he or she lacks 
trust. 
3.  Expectation of not being trusted: The fear that the other player will act based 
on motive 2, i.e. he will defect pre-emptively, could trigger defection.  This list could be continued infinitely, with each player trying to second-guess 
the motives of the other. It results in a further risk that is specific to synchronous 
situations, where all actors are trustor and trustee at the same time and have to decide 
concurrently. This additional risk is called strategic insecurity (Lahno, 2002a). It 
cannot be overcome by complete information about the other player's motives and 
preferences, but depends solely on the specific synchronous and symmetric structure 
of the game. In section 2.1, we have argued that this kind of strategic insecurity is an 
important hurdle to mutual trust in settings such as the public good problem. In 
organisational settings, however, even when we speak about mutual trust, we rarely 
refer to situations where two individuals have to reach a trust-decision at exactly the 
same time without knowing the other's decision (Lahno, 2002a). Trust is more likely 
to manifest itself and grow through sequential asynchronous trust-requiring situations, 
where on any given instance one individual is the trustor and the other individual the 
trustee (Luhmann, 1979; Bacharach & Gambetta, 2001).  
3.3 Trust-Warranting Properties 
Trust has been defined as an act that increases one’s vulnerability (see section 
1.2). This definition, however, leaves open what the source of this vulnerability could 
be. In a social dilemma situation, the other player’s decision to defect is clearly a 
source of vulnerability – but there are others. Deutsch (1958; 1960) sees motivation 
and ability as the basis of trust. If the trustee lacks either, the trustor makes himself 
vulnerable by trusting. Motivation of the trustee ensures that he will not choose to 
exploit the trustor’s vulnerability, and ability ensures that he will not involuntarily 
harm the trustor. In their work on organisational trust, Mayer et al. (1995) reviewed 
several definitions of trust that specify personal trust-warranting properties. They 
synthesise them into the categories of ability, benevolence and integrity (see Table 5). 
We add to these incentive structures, as trust-warranting properties that are not 
properties of an individual but an important real-world trust ensuring mechanism. In 
our view, social dilemma games do not model ability and only a subset of motivation 
as a source of vulnerability.   
 
TRUST-WARRANTING 
PROPERTY 
DEFINITION 
ABILITY  “… group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable a party 
to have influence within some specific domain.” (Mayer et al., 1995)  
– specific to a domain  
Benevolence  “… the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the 
trustor, aside from egocentric profit motive.” (Mayer et al., 1995) 
 – property of trustor-trustee relationship  
 
Integrity  “… the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds 
acceptable.” (Mayer et al., 1995) 
– property of trustee  
M
O
T
I
V
A
T
I
O
N
 
 
 
 
External 
Incentive 
Structure 
Organisational or institutional rules a trustee is subject to. 
(cf. Lahno, 2002b) 
Table 5: Trust-Warranting Properties. 
3.3.1 Ability 
In virtual teams – a core user group of CMC technologies – an individual’s 
wilful decision to defect or ‘cheat’ will not be the main source of vulnerability. Yet, in 
such a setting motivation is clearly of importance, as it ensures that the virtual team 
member is engaged in the task and does not prioritise others. However, if a critical 
task is assigned to a virtual team member, the concerns would not only include that 
she might not be motivated to perform, but also that she might not be able to perform, 
or that she misinterprets the instructions. Risks that are based on lack of competence 
or misunderstandings are more salient than wilful defection. 
Ability is domain-specific. Abilities that pertain to different domains have to 
be signalled in different ways, and are likely to require different channels to manifest 
themselves. As an example, an assessment of ability will differ depending on whether 
the task at hand is to jointly prepare a presentation or to jointly write a piece of code. 
Any study incorporating ability as a base of trustworthiness will have to address this 
issue when generalising to other situations. 
3.3.2 Integrity 
Integrity – a property of the trustee – ensures motivation by internalised codes 
of conduct, norms and values. An evaluation of integrity is based on an evaluation of 
the norms and values an individual claims to act on and an assessment of the 
conformity of his or her actions with these claims. Iterated social dilemma games with 
fixed identities that allow communication do allow an assessment of integrity, as 
participants can communicate their values and their conformance can be observed.  
Thus, the games used in recent CMC studies allow for trust based on integrity. 
3.3.3 Benevolence   
Benevolence is an appreciation of the trustor's good that forms a non-monetary 
incentive (exogenous pay-off) for the trustee to act as promised. It is not a property of 
the trustee, but a property of the relationship between the trustor and trustee. 
After initial empathy or liking is signalled, benevolence can be built through 
several risky interactions (McAllister, 1995). The initial signalling of empathy and 
liking can be very fast, and might to a great extent rely on immediate affective reactions. Such immediate effects can be tested within the social dilemma paradigm 
(Riegelsberger, Sasse, & McCarthy, forthcoming). However, strong feelings of 
benevolence depend on enduring relationships, built through many iterations of giving 
and receiving trust. Thus, in our view, benevolence is only marginally captured by 
current social dilemma games. These considerations call for longitudinal studies that 
extend beyond single experimental sessions (see section 5.3). 
3.3.4 External  Incentive Structure 
Another important motivation not to defect in real-world settings is an external 
incentive structure. The most common source of such an incentive structure are 
institutions (such as e.g. companies or law enforcement bodies) that establish and 
enforce rules to which individuals have to submit. Lahno (2002b) refers to trust based 
on association with an organisation as institutional trust. Organisations, through 
explicit rules and hierarchies, provide incentives for their members to act in specific 
ways. A trustor by trusting an organisation and the rules it is built on will thus transfer 
some of this trust to representatives of the organisation: “She’s with Accountants 
Unbribable, she must be trustworthy.” Organisations may thus act as implicit third-
party trust providers. Drawing again on the example of a virtual team, a team-
members motivation to perform might be ensured by organisational rules, hierarchies 
and control functions. 
This important aspect of trust in CMC is not taken in account in current social 
dilemma based trust research. The channel used or the context in which interaction is 
placed conveys much information on organisational association that will influence the 
perception of trust. Being contacted by someone on the company’s Intranet will result 
in a different level of a priori trust than being contacted via an Internet Relay Chat 
(IRC). Modelling this important aspect of trust transfer is difficult in a laboratory 
setting, as the institution that gives access to and provides the channel will be the 
researcher. 
3.3.5  Cognitive & Affective Trust 
Another high-level categorisation of trust is the distinction between cognitive 
and affective trust. This distinction is not based on properties of the trustee or his 
incentive structures, but on how cues of trustworthiness are processed and how trust is 
formed by the trustor. McAllister (1995) based his model of organisational trust on 
this distinction and Rocco et al. (2000) and Corritore et al. (2001) introduced it to 
trust research in CMC.  
Cognitive trust has also been termed reliance, assurance or confidence (Lahno 
2002b, Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). A trustee can encourage cognitive trust by 
signalling ability (see section 3.4.1), internalised norms of conduct (integrity) or by 
showing that his actions are governed by an external incentive structure (see section 
3.3.4). Such external incentive structures, an important source of cognitive trust, are 
often given in the form of institutional rules to which an agent submits. However, 
trust encompasses more than cognitive elements. Lahno (2002a, 2002b) defines trust 
as an emotional attitude, which encompasses cognitive as well as affective 
dimensions. This is mirrored in Mayer et al.’s (1995) definition that includes 
benevolence as one of the core dimensions of trust. We posit that affective trust on an 
initial level is based on interpersonal cues that result in immediate affective reactions 
(Goffman, 1956; Reeves & Nass, 1996). A medium's capability for immediately 
creating affective trust responses can be analysed with social dilemma games. Social 
dilemmas are very valuable tools to investigate immediate effects when e.g. comparing different channels for communication. They allow us to investigate the 
immediate effects on affective trust isolated from estimates of ability or integrity and 
without the drawbacks of other methods that are subject to participants’ post-
rationalisation. However, affective trust goes deeper than just immediate affective 
reactions, to include benevolence. As discussed above, social dilemma games are very 
limited with regard to including this trust-warranting property. 
Affective trust is an important dimension of trust that should not be 
underestimated in organisational settings, as it supports self-organisation 
(coordination) of work teams and reduces the need for costly formal control structures 
(Rocco et al., 2000; McAllister, 1995).  Figure 1 gives an overview of the dimensions 
of trust that are thought be of importance in different distant communication settings.  
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Figure 1: Bases of trust and their relationship with cognitive and affective trust. 
4 Discussion   
In section 3 we introduced several problems associated with PD-based social 
dilemma games as they are commonly used in CMC. In this section, we suggest 
improvements within the game-theoretical paradigm, and where appropriate advocate 
the use of other methods. 
4.1  Taxonomy of Trust 
We showed that real-world trust situations vary widely in terms of the type 
and gravity of risk they pose. Furthermore, one of the very reasons for trusting is that 
risks are not clearly identified or quantified and thus take the form of potential threats. 
A second dimension on which trust-requiring situations vary, and where PD based 
games only model a very small subset, is the structure  of such situations. As 
discussed in section 3.2, PD-based games are models of synchronous trust situations. 
This results in an additional specific risk called strategic insecurity. Most real-world 
situations are not synchronous, and thus can be better modelled by another class of 
social dilemma games (see section 4.3). In our view, adequately modelling sources of 
vulnerability other than wilful defection is the main problem within social dilemma 
games. In a negotiation task, an assessment of integrity might be the main building 
block of trust, whereas in a virtual team setting, ability will be of high importance 
when assigning important tasks.  We identified three dimensions in which trust-requiring situations differ:   
risks,  structure, and sources of vulnerability. The experimental approach taken to 
predict outcome in real-world situations should be determined by a situation’s 
location in this space. Thus, as a first step we see the need for a taxonomy of 
situations requiring trust that incorporates these and other relevant dimensions.  
4.2 Improved  Risk  Modelling 
Social dilemma games used as models for trust situations do lack real risks, 
i.e. the possibility of loss. Creating surrogate loss can overcome this problem. Based 
on a study by Yates & Watts (1975), researchers can create loss in experimental 
settings by handing out rewards that then can be lost in the course of the experiment. 
Yates & Watts (1975) maintain that participants act on this surrogate loss in a similar 
way to real loss. Another problem we identified is that unlike in real-world settings, 
defection is clearly identifiable in social dilemma games. ‘Market fluctuations’ as 
they are used by Zheng et al. (2002; see section 3.1) increase the complexity of the 
participants’ considerations. Both approaches are, however, only partial 
improvements, as they still only address the dimension of monetary pay-off. In real-
world settings, risks and benefits are likely to span several dimensions, such as 
embarrassment, pride or cognitive effort. Experimental trust research is bound by a 
lack of real and complex risk. 
4.3 Improved  Social Dilemma Games 
4.3.1 Trust  Games 
As real-world situations are unlikely to be synchronous and symmetric trust 
situations as modelled by PD-based games, experimental social dilemma games 
should be based on asynchronous Trust Games. Several researchers used 
asynchronous and asymmetric social dilemma games (Dasgupta, 1988; Kreps, 1990; 
Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Hayashi, Ostrom, Walker, & Yamagishi, 1999; 
Bacharach & Gambetta, 2001). We introduce the Trust Game, as described by 
Bacharach & Gambetta (2001): Like the PD game, it opposes collective and 
individual rationality. However, unlike in the symmetric PD game, the participants act 
on different pay-off tables. In a Trust Game, the trustor first decides whether to trust 
the trustee or not. Thus, decisions are taken asynchronously. The decision not to trust, 
results in withdrawing from the interaction. The hierarchy of outcomes for the trustor 
is as follows: (CC) trustee cooperates > no interaction > (CD) trustee defects
4. If the 
trustor decides to interact, the trustee can then decide whether to cooperate or defect: 
His experimental (endogenous) preferences are those of a PD game: (CD) defection > 
(CC) honouring given trust > no interaction. These make the situation risky for the 
trustor. Table 6 exemplifies the pay-off in a Trust Game. Trust-warranting properties 
(see section 3.3) may transform this endogenous hierarchy of preferences into: (CC) 
cooperation > (CD) defection.  
                                                 
4 This is the hierarchy of preferences as it is given in Bacharach & Gambetta’s Trust Game. 
However, there are real-world situations, where being defected is preferable to withdrawal.  
Trustee ⇒ 
⇓ Trustor 
Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate  1
3 
4
-3 
Withdraw 
 
..
1 
..
1 
Table 6: Example of a Trust Game pay-off table (based on Bacharach & Gambetta 
(2001)). 
This conflict between situational incentives to defect (based on experimental pay-off), 
and exogenous factors based on trust-warranting properties, is the very definition of a 
situation where trust is required (see section 1.2). Asynchronous trust games have 
increasingly received attention in economics and sociology, both in the form of 
experimental studies and in game-theoretical modelling (e.g. Raub 1992; Snijders 
1993; Gautschi, 1999). They have also been used to test the effect of different 
reputation sharing mechanisms on giving and honouring trust (Bohnet, Huck, & 
Tyran, forthcoming). Bohnet et al. (forthcoming) framed their version of the Trust 
Game as a sale: The trustor decides whether she wants to buy from a seller or not. If 
the trustor has decided to buy, i.e. risk an amount of money, the trustee can decide 
whether he wants to fulfil or defect. A continuous version of the Trust Game allows 
the trustor to send an amount of money to the trustee. Any amount sent is tripled by 
the researcher. The trustee then can decide how much to send back to the trustor 
(Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). In this example, any trustor purely acting on 
endogenous pay-off would send nothing, as she would expect the equally 
endogenously motivated trustor to return nothing. 
Thus, Trust Games allow for a separate analysis of the effects of technology on 
trusting and acting trustworthy. This is highly relevant to HCI researchers and 
practitioners, who should be concerned about designing technologies that allow for 
correct trust attribution, rather than just elevating users’ trust levels. A further benefit 
of Trust Games is that they do not create strategic insecurity a specific risk that is 
associated with symmetric and synchronous trust situations, such as public good 
dilemmas (see section 3.2). As participants in PD-based games are trustor and trustee 
at the same time, they have to base their decisions not only on an evaluation of the 
other player, but also on how the other player might evaluate them (see section 3.2). 
In summary, using asynchronous Trust Games, rather than synchronous PD-based 
games, allows for analysing giving trust and honouring trust separately, free 
participants from recursive considerations and model many real-world situations – 
that are mostly asynchronous – more accurately. 
4.3.2  Symbols and Symptoms 
A further advantage of Trust Games is that they allow modelling the problem 
of trust as a signalling problem (Bacharach & Gambetta, 2001). In order to be trusted, 
the trustee needs to signal to the trustor, that he has ‘pay-off transforming’ properties; 
that his actions are also governed by exogenous payoffs – brought about by e.g. 
specific norms, moral values, benevolence or care for own reputation rather than by 
the pay-off given in the current situation. Someone who can signal the possession of 
these properties is said to appear trustworthy. However, the situation is further 
complicated as individuals acting on raw payoff (i.e. non-trustworthy individuals) will 
also aim to appear trustworthy, so they will aim to send the signals that are associated with the possession of these trust-warranting properties. A problem with current 
communication technologies is that – in the perception of users – they make the 
emulation of these signals cheaper when compared to face-to-face communication 
(Riegelsberger & Sasse, 2001). It is easier to put on a friendly smile on a photograph 
that forms part of an online profile than it is to act friendly in a face-to-face encounter. 
The same holds true for expressing benevolence or adherence to trust-ensuring norms. 
Due to its richness, face-to-face interaction makes it hard to control all the cues given 
off. Less rich media, due to their lack of cues, make it easier to control these fewer 
cues that are transmitted (Riegelsberger & Sasse, 2001). Hence, signifiers that can be 
treated as symptoms of trustworthiness (i.e. they are robustly associated with trust-
warranting properties) become mere symbols when mediated and thus they do not 
allow users to infer the trustee’s trustworthiness
5. 
Hence, when designing technology to enable correct trust attribution, we must 
make it expensive for non-trustworthy individuals to emit the signals associated with 
trustworthiness, and cheap for trustworthy individuals to signal their intention or the 
possession of required trust-warranting properties. 
4.4 Trust-Warranting Properties  
The main disadvantage of social dilemma games in trust research is that they 
do not address sources of vulnerability adequately. Firstly, as discussed in section 3.3, 
the effect of some-trust warranting properties, such as ability, are hard to model. 
Secondly, they only allow researchers to observe the outcome of decisions, rather than 
giving indications as to what reasoning they are based on. 
Ideally, Trust Games should be coupled with pre-and post-experimental 
interviews to clarify the participant’s exogenous motivations.  Qualitative analysis of 
verbal data – using techniques such as Grounded Theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) 
and Discourse Analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987) – have been successfully 
employed to elicit user perceptions and attitudes on complex issues such as privacy 
(Adams & Sasse, 2000), security behaviour (Adams & Sasse, 1999; Weirich & Sasse, 
2001), and trust in e-commerce vendors (Riegelsberger & Sasse, 2001). In CMC trust 
research, they could also be used to establish participants’ perceptions of each other  
in a more complex way than rating scales can and thus give insight into the users’ 
basis for decisions. 
These approaches carry, however, all the known weaknesses of self-reported 
data – such as post-hoc rationalisation (Norman, 1993). This problem is particularly 
virulent in trust research, as trust is based not only on cognitive, but also on affective 
dimensions (see section 3.3.5). A potential remedy to this problem is employing a 
constructive interaction  scenario (Miyake, 1986), which HCI researchers have 
successfully employed to elicit users' models in ecologically valid settings (e.g. Clark 
& Sasse 1997). An experimental setting would pair up participants in such a way that 
they have to reach a joint decision, and thus have to verbalise their trust perceptions in 
a natural setting. To gain a more complete picture of the impact of interaction on the 
participants, and pinpoint critical phases during the interaction, objective 
physiological measures of user cost could be employed (see Wilson & Sasse, 2000). 
 
                                                 
5 The notion of symbols and symptoms of trustworthiness was developed during a seminar at 
the University of Duesseldorf, Department of Sociology, organised by Bernd Lahno and Michael 
Baurmann.  5 Conclusion 
The question of how HCI researchers should conduct research on trust in 
CMC presents itself as a dilemma: Experiments based on a game-theoretic paradigm 
allow for control, quantitative measurements, and avoid the problems of post-hoc 
rationalisation. However, they suffer from limited ecological validity and real-world 
applicability (see Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2: Advantages and Disadvantages of the methods discussed and 
suggested improvements. 
 
PD games are good models for synchronous and symmetric trust situations, 
such as public good problems. However, in most everyday trust situations, we can 
identify a trustor, who decides first, and a trustee who then decides to fulfil or defect. 
Trust Games are better models of such situations. They allow separating the analysis 
of trust and trustworthy behaviour and they avoid the problems of strategic insecurity.  
Social dilemma games in general can be improved by using surrogate risk and 
through measures that increase the complexity of decisions (e.g. market fluctuations). 
Furthermore, complementing them with the elicitation of qualitative data, e.g. in 
constructive interaction scenarios, will help to clarify participant’s basis for decisions. 
Social dilemma games are valuable tools to assess the impact of new technologies in a 
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PD-BASED GAMES  TRUST GAMES relatively simple and controlled way for a large group of situations – mainly those that 
are based on financial risk and lack of integrity as a source of vulnerability. A prime 
example is consumer-to-consumer (C2C) e-commerce, offered by auctioning systems 
such as eBay
6.   
However, many of the problems identified cannot be overcome within the 
game-theoretic paradigm: Experimental studies cannot subject participants to real or 
unknown risk, and experimental loss is monetary (i.e. mono-dimensional). 
Furthermore, affective trust bonds that grow over time, institutional trust and specific 
abilities cannot be modelled in one-off laboratory settings. Thus, results from social 
dilemma research need to be subjected to field experiments or longitudinal studies 
that rely on qualitative and ethnographic methods, as they have been employed by 
Jarvenpaa & Leidner (1998) and Herbsleb, Mockus, Finholt, & Grinter (2000).   
So far, CMC-research on trust using PD-based games, confirmed theoretical 
predictions on distant interaction: Rich media and acquaintance prior to distant 
interaction help users to develop trust. These conditions now need to be studied with 
the ecologically more valid methods mentioned above, ideally based on a taxonomy 
of trust that allows to clearly define an area of applicability. If this step is not 
undertaken, the field of HCI runs danger of falling into the same trap as social 
psychologists in the 1960ies, who conducted numerous variations of social dilemma 
experiments with little relevance for real-world group settings (Poundstone, 1993; 
Kollock, 1998).  
Finally, we have to remember that our efforts to design communication 
technology for trust are hindered by a paradox. The aim of such technologies is to 
decreases the cost of distant interaction by replacing face-to-face encounters with 
mediated ones. However, trust is won through iterations of risk-taking. The decision 
to meet someone face-to-face can bear a considerable cost and thus risk. The very fact 
that face-to-face communication is more costly than any technological surrogate gives 
it an advantage as signifier of one’s trustworthiness.  
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